The global crisis of 2008 caused both liquidity shortage and increasing insolvency in the banking system. The study focuses on credit default contagion in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, which originated in bank runs generated by non-performing loans granted to non-financial clients. In terms of methodology, the paper relies on one hand on review of the literature, and on the other hand on a data survey with comparative and regression analysis. To uncover credit default contagion, the research focuses on the combined impact of foreign exchange rates and foreign private indebtedness.
Introduction
The US financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the EU recession hit the European banking system gravely. Moreover, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) banking market showed a variety of individual hazardous impacts from national policies, foreign exchange rates, and solvency.
The crises led to stricter regulation and control in the banking sector: first and foremost, the increasing capital adequacy and solvency limits of Basel III.
Though in the second decade of the 21 st century, the CEE commercial banking sector has been operating in market economies for some time, the region has a legacy of the command economy that lasted until 1989. Benczes (2008) summarized this impact of the past on a banking sector which got liberalized and privatized a few decades ago and which was shifted towards a two-tier system and opened to foreign investors, who played the role of majority owner in an undercapitalized transition region. Besides, CEE markets are characterized by small scale, low financial penetration, and low degree of product diversification. This process generated individual characteristics for the vulnerability and stability of the CEE banking sector (Benczes 2008: 128-138) . According to Jokipii and Lucey (2002) , by the 2000s, privatization, deregulation, liberalization of licensing, and capitalization by foreign investors had been finished in the CEE banking sectors. The 1990s already saw market clearing by bank failures, especially in the case of under-capitalized, domestic small banks.
The regional and historical characteristics led to a relatively dynamic expansion of crediting from a low level of activity. This credit growth was accelerated by the economic catching-up of the region. (Kiss et al. 2006) The favourable global economic and financial circumstances and the medium-term growth of the CEE region led to risky exposure by lending activity measurable in credit/deposit ratio. As Benczes (2008: 135) argued, the CEE banking sector had to face challenges to "find the appropriate balance between an increased lending activity and to maintain a stable functioning".
Small scale, fragmented market structure is typical in CEE not only because of the fragmented country structure of the region, but also because of the various national financial-fiscalmonetary policy mixes and strategies. Sovereign risks and interest rate policies affected the structure of loans and deposits differently. Before the global and euro zone crisis, all CEE countries had national monetary autonomy. Some of them chose the strategy to pass it on to the European Central Bank as soon as possible (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia), or have been planning to do it soon (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania). Some others have strived -at least since 2010 -to preserve the national currency (Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary).
Some monetary authorities applied strict and high interest rates, some did not; some countries had higher foreign reserves, others had lower in the eve of the crisis, etc. These differences in policy modified and differentiated the credit and deposit structures of the countries. Due to the differences of national risk premium and interest rate policies, in those countries (Hungary, Baltics, Romania, Ukraine) which kept high rates beside giving opportunity for foreign currency loans, the depreciation of emerging market currencies by a global panic found their households and firms deeply indebted in euro, Swiss francs and other foreign currencies.
Those countries which kept their risk premium close to or under the euro zone in market rates, experienced insignificant exchange rate exposure in their loans. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that financial contagion was not uniform in the region.
The purpose of this study is to analyse the balance sheet and cash-flow impacts of various exchange rate risks in the CEE banking systems. The availability of data determined the countries included in the regression analysis, with the following countries being included:
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia. Although referred to at times, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, FYROM (Macedonia), Belarus, and Albania are not subjects of this analysis.
The hypothesis is that the difference of foreign exchange regimes and policies resulted in different contagion intensity in the CEE countries. The assumption is that the change of the foreign exchange (FX) rate determines the ratio of non-performing loans in the CEE countries in different degrees, depending on the exchange rate regime and the share of foreign loans during the global financial and economic crisis. Therefore, the FX asset crisis of banks depended on the volatility of foreign exchange, namely, the volume of the currency crisis induced by the global and European financial and output processes.
This study will give an overview on the relationship between banking contagion and foreign exchange risk and its relevance in CEE, and then makes or cites correlation calculations on exchange rate impacts. The methodology is, first, to introduce the banking path that led to the specific state of CEE countries after the global crisis of 2008. Then linear regression is calculated to examine the hypothesis in relation to FX and non-performing loans.
The CEE political decision-makers have treated the exchange rate primarily as a tool for competitiveness and economic growth. This strengthened the importance of short-term effects. The motivation of seeking correlation between exchange rate policy and financial contagion is to find the different impacts that various policies have.
The theory and methodology of financial contagion
The idea of the hypothesis originates in Darvas and Szapáry (1999) who analysed the financial contagion in the capital markets under different exchange rate regimes. The authors analysed the appropriate exchange rate regimes to defend the national capital markets from international financial crisis. For this purpose their study surveyed CEE and Israeli regimes from the aspect of nominal and real exchange rates, interest rates, risk spreads, variability of interest rates and the reaction of stock and bond markets for the previous variables. This paper focuses on bank financing. Caramazza et al. (2004) (Obstfeld (1994) calls this "second generation crisis").
The conditions of a currency crisis are defined by Camarazza et al. (2004) so that there is a significant depreciation of foreign exchange after robust appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER), and decrease in foreign reserves.
From our perspective, the banking contagion under different CEE monetary policies will be in the focus of this analysis. The financial contagion can be understood very broadly on any financial markets and systems. We are interested in a narrower meaning related to banking contagion only. Several definitions exist to describe the different aspects of financial contagion. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) explained it as a coordination failure between deposits and their use. Besides, their approach is that bank runs are not accidental but selffulfilling risks. In their early model, the vulnerability of banks was connected to the conflict between the withdrawal of deposits and the investments into illiquid (long term) assets. Battacharya et al. (1998) worded it as bank runs triggered by adverse information. Allan and Gale (1998) concentrated on the strong correlation between business cycles and bank runs by claiming financial crises as "inherent" parts of the business cycle. Bandt and Hartman (2001) joined the coordination failure explanation by defining banking contagion as a systemic failure of fundamentally solvent institutions. This systemic risk is manifested by comovements, cross-market events and interdependences (Forbes -Rigobon 2002) .
For example, Manz (2002) or Schoenmaker (1998) The contagion from capital linkages (or credit channel) is described by Schoenmaker as a "complex web" of interbank connections. The exposure always depends on the size of the borrowing bank and not of the lending one. And since 2008, the market must recognize that even borrowers of a "too big to fail" size are not riskless either. Kollman (2010) interprets the contagion concept as a mismatch between liquidity of bank assets and liabilities, which creates fragility in the banking system, thus multiplying the individual crisis impacts. Short deposits and long term loans are in contradiction in sense of liquidity. In the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , the stochastic, excessive withdrawal of deposits causes costly liquidation of bank assets, and maybe a default, too. Especially in a globalized financial market, banks hold international assets and liabilities, which create a geographical channel for contagion by global credit crunch. This is a typical cash-flow contagion approach, which derives the crisis from friction of maturity. Such a bank run is caused by a change of expectations when consumption appetite increases while saving propensity shrinks in parallel. The cash-flow contagion model was developed by Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Gorton (1985) by introducing asymmetric information and this way the risk of long term assets, namely, the depositors are not informed about the use of their deposits. This factor makes it possible to analyse bank runs induced by panic when the depositors see en masse withdrawals but do not know whether it happens because of increasing consumption or non-performing loans.
We can observe crisis from the aspect of default as well. The question of balance sheet contagion approach is the following: how can financial contagion appear and spread in a bank's assets? A general balance sheet of banks can be helpful. Among the assets, we can find cash, interbank loans, credit to non-bank partners, equity holding, as well as equipment and premises. In the liabilities, there are equity, interbank deposits, retail/wholesale deposits, and subordinated debt. Obviously, the spread of non-performing interbank debits and credits and the non-performing non-financial partners' loan can cause capital linkage-related contagion.
Besides, the depreciation of cross-holding financial equity can cause contagion through a financial market channel. Cross-holdings redistribute the liquidity in liquid times with plenty of credit supply, but in the case of liquidity shortage, withdrawals from deposits exceed shortterm assets, that is why long term asset liquidation becomes necessary. This leads to the depreciation of claims. Allen and Gale (2000: 4) explain that the interbank market and retail banking operate by very different mechanisms. The mismatches in retail banking enforce the bank to liquidate long term assets to be solvent toward short term depositors. The interbank failure occurs when a commercial bank cannot get any liquidity from other banks if its credit demand is in excess.
The excess demand appears, first, in a single region, but can quickly spread to the neighbouring ones, which ultimately causes need for liquidation and thus the depreciation of long term assets. Namely, the infected regions experience a decreasing value of their claims, which reduces the solvency and lending capacity of banks.
Allen and Gale (2000) constructed a 'liquidity preference' model which can analyse small shocks causing large contagion effects in the banking sector. The main risk in their understanding is rooted in the alternative of banks that they can choose for what term to lend their current deposits: short or long. Based on the previous theory of business cycle-related financial crisis (Allen -Gale 1998) , this model seeks real correlation and linkages between regions under financial contagion. In the model, liquidity preference is stochastic, which motivates risk sharing. The liquidity preference model is able to treat variously integrated financial markets from the aspect of a complete market structure, where every entity has impact on every other, up to the incomplete and disconnected market structures where the regions are particularly disintegrated or isolated. The banking crisis is understood as an excess demand for liquidity of the sum of the regions. They found evidence that an incomplete banking market structure with unilateral exposure among banks can show contagion.
When it comes to financial contagion, it actually it the probability of the spread of crisis (Lagunoff -Schreft 1998) . Rochet and Tirole (1996) applied this approach to bank runs, namely, they surveyed the probability of the system collapse from the fall of one bank.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1998) followed how the liquidity shortage goes through the credit chain.
Can banks do individually anything against financial contagion? Ex ante, prudent lending and low credit/deposit ratio used to be preventive, but sooner or later every bank got tempted to achieve high profit from a booming period of loans and asset prices -just like in the Minskycycle of financial crisis (Minsky 1982; 1992) . As Losoncz (2009) proved that CEE bank crediting is very much affected by extra-regional banks because these countries are heavily exposed to Western European banks. Morzuch and Weller (1999: 5-6) found that, besides the presence of multinational banks in CEE region, the following lowered the contagion risk in the 1990s. This is a very instructive list as many of them were not true in the 2000s:
-High risk premium threatened from local borrowing. This did not remain true for the 2000s, since in some countries market rates became low; other countries circumvented the high national rates with authorization of foreign-currency credit.
-Foreign exchange appreciation, which has been very typical in other emerging countries -mostly because of the exchange rate peg -, did not happen in CEE countries, so the financial assets did not become overvalued. This characteristic was neither completely true for CEE in the 2000s as some countries used pegging (Baltics, Bulgaria), or the interest rate policy strengthened the national currency unduly (Hungary, Romania).
-Default risk was low because of the economic prosperity. Before 2008 it was particularly true, but default risk was lower especially due to the high liquidity of global markets.
-Maturity risk from high share of short term loans, which can result in a quick wave of defaults, was not significant because of cautiously high reserves of official foreign assets. This was neither true in the 2000s. It was indicated by the general 20-30% depreciation of CEE national currencies fundamentally in every CEE country (except the Baltic countries and Bulgaria pegging strictly) that in terms of their foreign reserves, CEE national banks were unprepared for the sudden illiquidity in the end of 2008. Klein (2013) analysed the impact of macroeconomic variables on credit default. This survey was based on a dynamic panel regression distinguishing bank-level (equity-to-assets, ROE, Loans-to-assets, change of loans), country specific (unemployment, inflation, exchange rate) and global variables (euro zone GDP growth, volatility of S&P 500 as a risk aversion indicator).
The following methodology is built on linear regression analysis with SPSS. 
where NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, GDP i is the change of quarterly GDP, i i is the quarterly three-month market rate, and FXDIF is the ratio of the quarterly average exchange rate difference from average exchange rate of 2 nd quarter of 2008 (right before the crisis), in euro to national currency:
The complex analysis of CEE countries already has been made by Klein (2013) as referred to above. Our focus is on FX impact because Klein's model ignored the importance of foreign currency credit ratio and the exchange rate regime on spot rate (see explanation later). We seek a relationship between nominal FX depreciation shocks and credit default contagion.
Nominal FX is reasonable as external loan financing is sensitive on the spot rate but not on REER or NEER.
The function for this regression is the following:
Of course, the FX exposure resulting in a credit default can be the simplest to channel by the foreign currency loans into the banking system. This cannot be ignored. To preserve the transparency of the analysis, it is preferable to create clusters in the dimensions of change of FX rates, change of non-performing loans rates, and share of foreign loans form the total assets before doing the regression analysis. The change of FX rate will be established as follows: substitute in equation (2) relationship between the degree of development and credit growth. However, it is more important to recognize generally about CEE countries that the extension of credits were significantly faster than the growth of deposits (see Figure 1) . This finally created a credit/deposit ratio, where the credits significantly exceeded the deposits, which resulted in an interbank contagion risk.
Contagion in the CEE

The pre-crisis structure of CEE from the aspect of contagion
The general tendency of CEE (according to Raiffeisen 2013) is that loans significantly exceeded deposits before the crisis, which was followed by a correction forced by the global markets. From this ratio it could be foreseen which countries had to face serious balance-sheet contagion risk from uncovered credit defaults. This risk was multiplied by the exchange rate factor in case of Ukraine, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Belarus, and Serbia. Besides, those countries faced the crisis with a less fragile banking sector with a loan/deposit ratio under 100 percent. Klein (2013) sought the reasons for non-performing loans in CEE and SEE regions. As it is clear from his regression analysis, there is a not too strong but significant negative correlation between GDP growth and the increase of credit defaults. He specifically found that recession is a factor of contagion. His paper tried to find a connection between credit default and other macroeconomic indicators as well but these significances are questionable, or many of them are not significant even at 10%.
Credit contagion
However, Klein (2013) found evidence that the solvency of CEE debtors is a little bit sensitive to the recession of the euro zone. He concluded that, in case of the bank-level indicators, the estimations show that a higher equity-to-assets ratio leads to lower NPLs, therefore confirming the "moral hazard" effect; and higher profitability (RoE) contributes to lower NPLs and suggests that better managed banks have, on average, better quality of assets.
[…] Unlike in other studies mentioned earlier, other bank-level indicators such as the bank size and expense-to-income ratio were not found to have significant impact.
On the macroeconomic level, the results show that an increase in unemployment contribute to higher NPLs, thus validating the strong link between the business cycles and the banking sector's resilience. In addition, both higher inflation and the depreciation of currency were found to increase NPLs.
Concerning global environment factors (Klein 2013:12) :
Higher volatility index and lower Euro area growth reduce the firms' capacity to repay, perhaps because of higher rates in the international financial markets, which reduce the firms' ability to rollover their debt, and because of lower export revenues. In addition, these two factors may also lead to lower external funding of the banks and therefore may result in negative credit growth […] .
In the case of FX rate effects, Klein (2013) could find a very week correlation with credit default, and in the case of some of the methods applied by him, it had no significance. (More general methods of moment were applied.) This calculation ignored tow facts: firstly, some countries in the region have used fixed FX rates. Fixed or almost fixed nominal spot rate cannot have room to measure effects. We have to note that FX rate impact can be measured not only by nominal spot rate but by any real effective exchange rate as well. However, REER-based calculation cannot focus merely on FX spot rate nominal effects, which matters for the debtors' solvency. Secondly, the share of loans based on foreign currency and foreign borrowing has importance in the volume of FX rate impact. For example, the sharp credit growth in Baltic countries was absolutely financed from foreign credit in euro, thus the net foreign liabilities to the private sector credit climbed up to 35-55% in 2008. Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic, this ratio remained negative, namely there was internal financing. Most of the CEE countries had this ratio in the range of 5 to 25% (IFS data from Árvai et al. 2009:10-11) . That is why, in our analysis, we run a regression only on those countries and periods which have no fixed FX rate and no membership in the single currency zone. Besides we create clusters of countries according to domestic and foreign financing ratios. Figure 2 shows the difference between countries indebted mostly in foreign or local currency.
Although the private loan to GDP ratio is comparable between Slovakia and Hungary, or between Poland and Romania, but the multiplication of non-performing loans is significantly faster as a result of the crisis in the case of Hungary and Romania, which were financed from foreign loans.
The FX rate depreciation hit mostly Hungary, Poland, Romania and Ukraine with a depreciation of 20 to 30%. If we compare this with the ratio of foreign currency credit and external financing, it will be clear that these two factors strongly determined the banking contagion based on credit default risk. Besides, if we consider the pre-crisis HUF, RON, UAH, HRK highly overvalued by high market rates in comparison to euro rates, it can be understood how the foreign currency loans could become toxic assets in these countries, while the rest of CEE was affected "only" by the other factors of credit default (global recession, national recession, unemployment). From market interest rates (Figure 3 ) it is clear that before the crisis, Romania, Croatia, and Hungary had to compensate fundamental risks with high national market rates. Thus, it was clear that local actors turned to FX credits with significantly lower market rates. In the case of ROE and ROA analyses (Raiffeisen 2013) , it is harder to connect the damage of banks to the FX rate impact. It is more likely that discretionary effects, such as banking tax, or national recession factors determined the earnings much strongly. Source: author's composition based on Raiffeisen (2013) Note: dots represent country-year combinations, e.g. HR10= Croatia in 2010
The FX impact analysis
According to the methodology explained in section 2, the first stage of analysis is to create clusters in two steps. The first step is shown in Figure 5 , which includes the change of FX rate and the change of NPL ratio. The second step is incorporated into Figure 6 , where countries with a volatile exchange rate regimes are split into two further groups.
According to Figure 5 and Figure 6 , three groups of countries can be distinguished: (1) the group of rigid FX rate countries, which used a currency board or a similar arrangement, or adopted the euro. (2) The group of locally financed countries, which means that although they had volatile FX rates, the significant majority of the loans was financed in local currency. (3) The group of foreign-financed countries which means that apart from a volatile FX rate, they were financed in foreign (currency) loans with high FX risk.
From Figure 5 it is obvious, that those countries which had pegging to euro or joined the euro zone early on the eve of the crises could not have a significant impact from the euro FX rate.
In the case of euro zone members and successful currency boards, we simplify the situation to no FX risk. It does not make sense to analyse the spot rate impact on credit default. These countries can be excluded from our FX analysis: Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia. Only Hungary had been indebted significantly in a different currency (CHF), where cross rates still matter in HUF-EUR-CHF relations, but this country is not in the rigid rate group.
From Figure 6 with the rest, we have to recognize that the countries from the group of locally financed ones in crediting had a very narrow credit channel to accumulate the FX risk in the banking system through loans. The following ones belong to the locally financed group:
Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia. At the same time, it has been opposite in the group of foreign-financed countries. The foreign-financed group includes Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine, and Romania. Croatian data are also indicated in Figure 6 to show its indebtedness, but as it has had a peg with a narrow floating margin, the country is not included in the regression analysis for the reasons explained about pegging. The result of linear regression analysis is summarized in Figure 7 . Although results are not robust, difference can be measured between states of local or foreign currency financed economies in the regression of the NPL ratio and the FX rate volatility. We can establish that in the case of countries financed in foreign currency, the ratio of NPL has had stronger correlation with changes in FX rates. This difference appeared both in the constant and the beta, and also in the case of r 2 . The r 2 is small in both groups, which means that the regression curve does not fit the variables very well. The standard error of estimation is bigger in the case of foreign currency financed economies, which suggests a weaker accuracy of beta.
However, the significance of the estimation on foreign currency financed group is 0.03 < 0.05, which means that the estimator is correct with an accuracy of 95 percent. At the same time, the significance of the estimation on the local currency financed group is 0.25, which means that this estimator cannot be considered acceptable.
In summary, we can conclude that the currency of indebtedness and the national policies led to a portfolio of loans by currency mattered in credit default during the crisis, which thus determined the credit contagion, too. Source: author's calculation
Conclusions
In this paper, we analysed the contagion effects in the CEE region. We established the relevant aspects of banking contagion in the region. We excluded the information contagion because of its regional irrelevance. We cited the previous researches on correlation between macroeconomic indicators and banking contagion in CEE region. The change of GDP, the FX rate, the interest rate can significantly determine the credit defaults and this way the contagion risk. We focused on the FX rate impacts.
We can recognize that the CEE region has had specific banking and policy circumstances affecting the risk of contagion. The countries in the region are not unanimous in source of risk and structure of crediting. Although, the region had common, similar post-Communist transitionary past, the more than two decades of market economy created significant policy, economic and social differences, which were enough to differentiate among the national economies. It must be taken into account that multinational ownership has significance in the CEE region as a softener of contagion risk. Besides, the policy differences before the crisis determined the inherited stock of external or FX debt on the national level.
We classified the CEE countries by non-performing loans, FX rate volatility and currency composition of loans. The countries with a pegged euro rate (strict pegging or euro membership) were classified where the actual volatility of FX spot rate is zero, which means that its impact on debtors' solvency is insignificant. We split the rest of the countries into two groups, one with majority of local currency loans, and another with foreign currency loans.
The separate regression analysis of the two groups showed differences, therefore we could conclude that the currency of loan financing has had determining power on the accumulation of credit defaults during a recession period. Consequently credit contagion is measurable in the CEE region and it was multiplied by the FX risk.
It has been proved that those countries which believed they could finance themselves and their private sector from FX loans with low risk premium with high country risk actually worsened their own external financial position. The difference can be observed in the regression analysis by clusters.
